Stouffer asked his respondents nine questions about placing restrictions on the activities 2 of an admitted Communist. The responses ranged from the 89.6 % who would fire the Communist from a job working in a defense plant (and the 89.4 % who would fire the Communist from a job teaching in a university) to a "low" of 35.5 % who would stop buying a brand of soap that was plugged by a Communist on a radio show. 
antidemocratic tendencies of the mass public. Earlier empirical work on the tolerance of elites and masses includes Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Lipset 1960; Prothro and Grigg 1960; and McClosky 1964 . A more recent analysis of some of the propositions of elitist theory can be found in Gibson and Bingham 1985. For useful reviews of the tolerance literature see Sullivan and Transue 1999 and Gibson 4 2006a. For the identification of some "enigmas" in extant research on political tolerance see Gibson 2006b.
-2-less appetite for intolerance. Out of Stouffer's research emerged highly influential "elitist" theories of democracy (e.g., Bachrach 1967) , as well as an intellectual concern that has persisted 3 for fifty years about the causes and consequences of the intolerance of ordinary citizens. 4 The United States in the post 9/11 era is said by some observers to have entered a new period of McCarthyism. Critics point, for example, to such legislation as the Patriot Act as evidence that the spirit of the Republican Senator still casts a long shadow over the land (e.g., Baker and Kavanagh 2005) . On its face, this claim seems unlikely to be true: Loyalty oaths are not today commonplace, no investigations have been launched into subversive influences within powerful institutions such as Hollywood or the U. S. Army, and the number of people losing For example, Brown (1958) estimated that out of the work force of 65 million, 13 5 million were affected by loyalty and security programs during the McCarthy era. Furthermore, more than 11,000 individuals were fired as a result of government and private loyalty programs.
More than 100 people were convicted under the federal Smith Act, and 135 people were cited for contempt by the House Un-American Activities Committee. Nearly one-half of the social science professors teaching in universities at the time expressed medium or high apprehension about possible adverse repercussions to them as a result of their political beliefs and activities (Lazarsfeld and Thielens 1958) . The Communist Party was essentially obliterated. By comparison, the post 9/11 repression seems quite limited.
-3-their jobs owing to their political views is not large (although nor is it zero). A reasonable view 5 of public policy in the current period is that freedom has been restricted -especially for those without the protection of American citizenship -but that widespread political repression has not yet materialized. Nonetheless, an appreciable threat exists that more draconian restraints on political freedom will be put in place in the future, especially if there is another direct attack on American soil.
Social scientists have been slow to contribute to the debate over intolerance and repression in the contemporary United States (but see Davis 2007 ; see also Rasinski et al. 2002 and Davis and Silver 2004) . How does the current period compare to the McCarthy past? How intolerant are Americans today? Is more or less freedom available to citizens than during the McCarthy era? To what degree is intolerance concentrated on particular groups or ideologies; is the contemporary period an example of what happens when intolerance becomes focused rather than pluralistic (e.g., Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982) ? In short, how much freedom has -4-been lost to 9/11, and whose freedom is being sacrificed today? The purpose of this paper is to provide answers to these questions based primarily on a nationally representative survey conducted in 2005 and the original Stouffer survey data. In addition, since many of the same questions were put to a nationally representative sample in 1987 (e.g., Gibson 1992a), comparison is also made to that period of American politics.
The theory I test in considering these questions is that of pluralistic intolerance. This theory, developed by Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1982;  see also Gibson 1985 Gibson , 1998 , asserts that the likelihood that intolerance will be benign rises if it is unfocused (pluralistic). In the 1950s, intolerance was sharply focused on left-wing dissenters. Today, some suspect that intolerance is concentrated on Muslim extremists. To the extent that the enemies of the system are clearly defined -whomever that may be at any given moment in history -intolerance becomes concentrated and is likely to have pernicious consequences, such as the limitation of individual political freedom. Thus, this research, unlike most studies in the subfield, focuses upon the consequences of political intolerance for political freedom in a democratic political system. I therefore begin the empirical portion of this analysis with an examination of the degree of political freedom existing today in comparison to Stouffer's 1954 survey. Do Americans today perceive less freedom as being available to them, in comparison to the McCarthy era? The freedom I consider is individual perceptions of liberty -the degree to which people feel that they can express their political views with relative impunity.
I next consider political intolerance now and fifty years ago. Although Communists no longer represent the threat that the Americans perceived in the early 1950s, the data provide Given the small number of data points, it is of course impossible to conduct any rigorous 6 analysis of the relationship between objective socio-political environmental variables and levels of mass political intolerance. Nonetheless, it is interesting to consider the relationship between aggregate levels of threat and intolerance. Using McCann's measures of threat -defined as referring to "what might be considered as threats or stressors of crises of a social, economic, or political nature faced by the populace or by substantial portions of the populace" (McCann 1998, 435 ) -I note that in 1954 the threat score was 3.4 and in 1987 it was 3.8 (on a seven-point scale, with high scores indicating more threat). However, threat declined significantly between 1953 and 1954 (from 4.2 to 3.4), and threat was even higher in the period from 1950 to 1952.
McCann's scores end in 1992, so none is available for the period around the 2005 survey.
Moreover, we have no idea how these objective measures map onto subjective perceptions.
Nonetheless, it is not implausible that levels of objective threat were roughly comparable in 1954, 1987, and 2005, and that 1954 and 2005 may be especially similar in that both years reflect some lessening of tensions after a period of relatively intense conflict (the Korean War and the 9/11 attack). The many hazards of making this sort of gross comparison of time periods, however, warn against pursuing this sort of analysis much further, even if we can have considerable confidence that threat was focused in the early 1950s. .
-5-some ability to compare contemporary levels of political intolerance with that of the 1950s. 6 Throughout most of this analysis, interracial differences are hypothesized (and in fact discovered).
In the final portion of the analysis, I examine the distribution of these attitudes within the American public. In particular, I assess whether those who are sympathetic to various groups are -6-more likely to be intolerant and to perceive constraints on their freedom. Perhaps the most interesting finding here is that sympathizers with relatively extreme groups are not necessarily those who perceive the greatest limitations on their political freedom in the contemporary U.S.
This may be a function of the dispersed -or perhaps a better word is "multi-focused" -nature of intolerance today. My most important theoretical conclusion is that the theory of pluralistic intolerance must be reconceptualized to acknowledge that even unfocused intolerance can create a culture of conformity that discourages those with unpopular views from asserting themselves politically.
Pluralistic Intolerance
One of the most important ideas to emerge from the tolerance literature is the theory of pluralistic intolerance. According to Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1982) , lack of consensus on who the enemy is -pluralistic intolerance -can neutralize even widespread intolerance (even if it does not necessarily do so, as for example, in the case of determined elites). When everyone selects a different group as their most hated foe, the result may be that insufficient agreement exists for intolerance to be mobilized into political repression. When intolerance is pluralistic, it is dispersed and may therefore be relatively benign.
The underlying assumption of the theory of pluralistic intolerance is that a united public will most likely succeed in getting what it wants; to the extent that people agree in identifying the predominant threat to a political system, their demands for political repression will ring loudly in the ears of their representatives. This simple "demand input" model -what people want they get -drives the theory of pluralistic intolerance. The theory strongly emphasizes the need to identify the factors contributing to the focusing and unfocusing of intolerance, for it is focused intolerance that can be dangerous and pernicious (see Sullivan et al. 1985) .
Unfortunately, little rigorous research at the system level (either over time or crossnationally) has investigated the theory of pluralistic intolerance. In their micro-level research on South Africa, Gibson and Gouws (2003) discovered that intolerance can be both focused and pluralistic, in the sense that many groups, of various ideological affinities, may not be tolerated by people. Gibson (1998) , on the other hand, asserts that intolerance is focused on the far rightwing in Russia (see also Gibson and Duch 1993) . More research needs to be conducted to determine the "breadth" of tolerance in different societies -the range of ideas that people believe can be legitimately expressed in a society.
Nonetheless, it seems clear that during the 1950s, the United States was undoubtedly a society characterized by considerable consensus in target group selection. The Communist Party and its suspected sympathizers were subjected to significant repression, and there seemed to be a great deal of support for such actions among large segments of the political leadership as well as the mass public . . . The political fragmentation and the proliferation of extremist groups in American politics since the 1950s has undoubtedly resulted in a greater degree of diversity in target group selection. If this is the case, such a situation is less likely to result in repressive action, even if the mass public is roughly as intolerant as individuals as they were in the 1950s (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982, 85, emphasis in original) .
Thus, research in the 1970s pointed to a distribution of multiple targets of intolerance that -8-impeded mass preferences from having repressive consequences.
One important limitation of the theory of pluralistic intolerance is that its primary (if not exclusive) focus is on repression brought about via public policy (the "demand input" model).
Some research has found the linkage between ordinary citizens and policy makers to be weak or non-existent (e.g., Gibson 1988 Gibson , 1989 , so even focused public intolerance may not always produce political repression. And perhaps even when the majority of people are not united in their intolerance, important political consequences may flow.
An alternative pathway of influence is via cultural norms of conformity. Intolerance may constrain freedom not through government sponsored public policies but rather through norms that discourage disagreement and that sanction opinions deviating very far from the mainstream.
Tocqueville observed long ago that "I know of no country in which there is so little independence of mind and real freedom of discussion as in America" (1948, vol. 1, p. 263) . In Noelle-Neumann's "spiral of silence" people are encouraged "either to proclaim their views or to swallow them and keep quiet until, in a spiraling process, the one view dominated the public scene and the other disappeared from public awareness as its adherents became mute" (1984, 5) .
To the extent that unpopular views are sanctioned through inter-personal mechanisms, it may be unnecessary for a majority of the people to be intolerant of an idea. Moreover, the homogeneity of social networks may make it easy to identify those with aberrant views, entirely apart from the overall distribution of opinions within a country. As Mutz has noted: "If people are surrounded by people who think much like they do, they will be less aware of the legitimate arguments on the other side of contemporary political controversies . . . The capacity to see that there is more than one side to an issue, that a political conflict is, in fact, a legitimate controversy with For earlier research based on this approach, see Gibson 1992a , 1993 the distinction between objectively available freedom and subjectively perceived freedom is -9-rationales on both sides, translates to greater willingness to extend civil liberties to even those groups whose political views one dislikes a great deal " (2002, 122 , emphasis in the original).
The existence of homogeneous social network can therefore exacerbate the consequences of intolerance, quite apart from any linkage to repressive public policy (see also Huckfeldt, Ikeda, and Pappi 2005) .
In general, the theory of pluralistic intolerance is largely silent about the cultural consequences of mass political intolerance. It is therefore important that research address the question of how free ordinary people feel to express their political views. Fortunately, Stouffer's survey specifically addressed this matter so a useful comparative baseline from the McCarthy era is available.
Political Freedom, Then and Now
How does the contemporary period in the United States compare with the McCarthy era with regard to the political freedom available to ordinary citizens? There are many ways in which levels of political freedom might be measured, as, for instance, in studies of the degree of freedom proclaimed by statutes and constitutions. Following Stouffer and others (e.g., Gibson 1992a), my approach here is to conceptualize freedom as an individual-level perception. From this viewpoint, the appropriate way to measure freedom is to ask individuals about the constraints they perceive on their ability to express their political views without repercussions from those around them or from the state. (Goldstein 1978) . Communists in jail, who had gone underground, or who had left the country were obviously unavailable to be interviewed in Stouffer's research. The respondents were also asked about whether they themselves feel free to speak their mind on political matters. The results are reported in the lower portion of Table 1 .
These data also support the conclusion that political freedom has diminished in the United States, although it must be noted that this is within the context of three-fourths of the American people claiming to feel free. Moreover, these data are perhaps most interesting for what they reveal about the McCarthy era: At the height of the Red Scare, nearly 85 percent of the American people asserted that they enjoyed freedom of speech. Thus, the repression of that era seems to have been sharply focused on (or at least felt by) a relatively small political minority, and perhaps had relatively limited consequences for the larger body politic. Today, 11 the percentage feeling generally free is about ten percentage points lower than in 1954.
In some sense, the data in these two tables are entirely consistent. Some people in the U.S. in fact do not feel free to speak their political minds -indeed, at least one-fourth of the If any evidence of this last assertion is necessary, it is perhaps worth noting that It is beyond the scope of this analysis to provide a comprehensive discussion of 13 -12-American people are in this category today. So when 45.7 % of the sample reports that they perceive some Americans as not being free, they are accurate in their perceptions. Those who believe that all feel free, or those who believe that hardly anybody feels free, hold, according to these data, inaccurate perceptions.
Of course, a simple dichotomy responding to a single question constitutes a poor measure of the extent of political freedom in the United States. We therefore asked several additional questions in 2005 about perceived constraints on individual freedom (questions that were also used in the 1987 survey but not in 1954). The replies to these queries are reported in Table 2 .
[PLACE TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
In 2005, substantial majorities of the American people believe that they would be allowed to engage in various types of political protest. Perhaps what is most surprising about these data, however, is the size of the minority believing the government restricts their political expression. Roughly four in ten Americans, for instance, believe their government would not allow them to organize a public meeting to oppose the government. Only 52.0 % of the respondents judge themselves free to engage in all three of these political activities (data not shown). This strikes me as a remarkably small percentage for an established democracy like the United States , especially in that the activities about which people were questioned are quite 12 innocuous. 13 intolerance, freedom, and democratic theory (see, for example, Gouws 2003, and Gibson 2006a) . The short form of the theory asserts that a) liberal democracies require unfettered opportunities for political viewpoints to compete in the marketplace of ideas, b) constraints on competition can arise from governmental actions but also from pressures toward cultural conformity, and c) mass political intolerance is an important source of both demands for public policy and for conformity. I do not equate political tolerance or political freedom with democracy -and indeed, at the extreme, it is even conceivable that increments in political tolerance actually threaten democracy -but under most circumstances, I hypothesize that greater freedom and tolerance enhance the contestation necessary to democratic governance.
Note that the 1987 survey had a bona fide oversample of African Americans and 14 therefore the analysis could give this group much more substantive attention than is possible with the 2005 sample.
-13-Some perspective can be gotten by comparing these data to the comparable survey conducted in 1987 (see also Table 2 ). The data reveal remarkable similarity across the two periods, with a slight tendency for Americans in 2005 to perceive more freedom available to them than in 1987. For example, in 1987, 38 .2 % of the American people felt that they would not be allowed to organize a protest march; by 2005, this figure declined by 5 to 6 percentage points to 32.5 %. Perhaps the small amount of change the data reveal is located, however, in a particular sub-segment of the overall population.
An analysis of the 1987 survey (Gibson 1992a ) revealed enormous racial differences in perceptions of freedom. So as to be able to compare the 2005 and 1987 findings, Table 3 reports the data from the contemporary period broken down by the race of the respondent.
-14-[PLACE TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
The first observation to be made on the basis of Table 3 is that substantial racial differences still exist in perceived freedom in 2005. In each instance, African Americans perceive less freedom than whites, and the differences in percentages range roughly from 10 to 20 percent. The interracial contrasts are not as stark at they were in 1987, but they are still substantial.
On all three activities, black Americans perceive more political freedom today than they did in 1987. For instance, on whether they think they would be allowed to organize public One of the aspects that made Communism so threatening to the Americans was its close 15 association with godlessness. For example, it was during this era that the phase "under God" was added to the Pledge of Allegiance (e.g., Russo 2004 ). Politics is more complicated today, and therefore rather than asking people their views of pre-selected groups, it is prudent to allow the respondents to tell us which groups and ideas, if any, they find objectionable. The standard technology for accomplishing this is the "least-liked" Only 7.2 % of the respondents added a group to the list, and these groups were 16 extremely varied. Only a tiny fraction of those nominating an extra group selected one of these supplemental groups as among their three most disliked groups.
-16-measurement strategy. Developed by Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1982) , this approach allows all respondents to identify groups/ideas they dislike. Tolerance and threat questions are then asked with regard to these groups. Thus, although the nominal group about which the questions are framed varies for each respondent, the questions are "content controlled" in the sense that all individuals are asked about groups they find highly objectionable. The least-liked approach to measuring intolerance has been used widely in tolerance research throughout the world (e.g., Gibson and Gouws 2003; Gibson and Duch 1993; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003) .
This approach to measuring intolerance therefore begins by asking the respondents to rate a variety of pre-selected groups in terms of how much they like or dislike the group. These affect questions were used in part as a means of getting the respondents to think broadly about groups, including those that might be considered by some to be on the fringes of American politics. The respondents were then told they could supplement this list with any other group they dislike a great deal. Next, they were asked to indicate which three groups from the supplemented list they disliked the most. The selected groups are shown in Table 4 , as are the affect ratings (on a 1 16 through 11 scale) for each of the groups.
[PLACE TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
The most commonly disliked group in America today is the Ku Klux Klan, with slightly less than half of the respondents naming the Klan as most disliked, and almost three-fourths putting the KKK on the list of the three most disliked groups. Nazis were also widely named as One can also see support for this assertion in the sizable standard deviations on the 17 group affect continua. Excluding the Klan and Nazis, the standard deviations indicate considerable divergence in the degree to which the various groups are hated.
-17-among the most disliked groups, although they were considerably less likely to be identified as most disliked. Apart from the KKK and Nazis, no other group is targeted by a majority of Americans. Perhaps the single greatest surprise is that atheists (those who are against all religion and churches) would attract the ire of one in five Americans, a figure about equivalent to that for Communists and for those who would do away with elections and let the military run the country.
Is this distribution of groups "pluralistic?" From the frequencies of the most-disliked groups alone, one might conclude that it is, since no single group captures the enmity of a majority of the American people. On the other hand, considering groups rated as among the three most disliked groups, a significant majority of Americans rate Klansmen and Nazis as among their three most disliked groups. Beyond these two groups, considerable dissensus emerges:
Only slightly more than one-third of the Americans rate Radical Muslims as among their most disliked groups (and Radical Muslims are disliked to the same degree that the Americans dislike atheists). After Muslims, not even one-fourth of the respondents are in agreement about their antipathy toward the groups. Given that the Ku Klux Klan and Nazi groups are hardly salient in contemporary American politics, one might conclude from these data that the distribution of group antipathy is pluralistic, with little agreement as to who the extremists are, except in the extreme.
17
The 2005 survey only asked the respondents to name their three most disliked groups.
-18-This does not mean, however, that other groups are not equally disliked. To investigate the breadth of groups highly disliked by the American people requires a few additional analytical steps.
1. For each respondent, the maximum positive affect for any group within the three most disliked groups was identified.
2. Affect scores toward the other groups on the list (including any supplementary group nominated by the respondent) were compared to the maximum positive affect found among the three most disliked groups.
3. In counting the number of additional groups with affect scores equal to those of the three most liked disliked group, I have not counted affect scores indicating neutrality or positive affect (which characterizes only nine respondents). In these instances, the number of tied groups was set equal to zero.
The result of this methodology is an indicator of the number of groups with affect scores as low or lower than the "most-liked" group of the three most disliked groups. The distribution of this variable is as follows. Only 15.3 % of the respondents did not rate a group outside the three-most disliked with an equally low level of affect. Thus, in some sense the three most-disliked groups are distinctive. A total of 23.1 % named five or more additional groups. The median number of groups named is 3 (with a mean of 2.9). Thus, by any accounting, the three most disliked groups people identify are far from unique. The three most disliked groups are generally highly disliked, but so too are many other groups active in American politics. Group antipathy in the United States is broadly distributed, a consequential finding to which I will return shortly.
Tolerance questions were asked with reference to two groups -the most disliked group For the minuscule proportion of respondents naming no second or third group, we used 18 either "those who advocate creating a new, separate nation for only white people in America" or "those who advocate creating a new, separate nation for only black people in America," depending upon the respondent's race.
-19-and "another highly disliked group." The latter is the third-most disliked group if the respondent named one (71.2 % of the respondents). If no third group was named, then the second-most disliked group was used in the questions (23.1 %). As will be demonstrated in the analysis 18 below, not much difference exists for most respondents between their perceptions and judgments of the two groups about which we asked.
The respondents were asked three tolerance questions about the most disliked group and what I refer to as another highly disliked group. Following theories of liberal democracy (e.g., Dahl 1971) , and extant research on political intolerance (e.g., Gibson and Gouws 2003) , our queries concerned whether these groups should be allowed to speak, demonstrate, and run candidates for office. The results are reported in Table 5 .
[PLACE TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
The data in this table document widespread political intolerance in the United States today. For each of the six questions, more than one-half of the respondents gave an intolerant reply to our query. Only something on the order of one-third of the respondents expressed a tolerant viewpoint. Little variation exists across the various activities, and surprisingly small differences can be found between the judgments of the most disliked group and another highly disliked group. Indeed, more than one half of the sample (54.1 %) gave no tolerant replies to the questions about the most disliked group; only a somewhat smaller percentage (44.5 %) would For a comparison of the two approaches to measuring political tolerance see Gibson   19 1992b.
-20-tolerate none of these activities by the other highly disliked group (data not shown). By any accounting, intolerance appears to be fairly common in the United States.
As Table 4 Table 4 also shows, however, only 19.6 % of the Americans named Communists as among their three most disliked groups. From these data, direct comparison to the McCarthy era therefore does not seem feasible.
However, the 2005 survey also asked all respondents tolerance questions with reference to four pre-selected groups. Table 6 reports the degree to which the American people are 19 willing to tolerate demonstrations by these four groups. The question specifically asked about how the respondent would react to a decision by local authorities to ban a public demonstration by these various groups. The groups were selected to represent a variety of ideological points-ofviews, with two groups (Communists and atheists) drawn from the leftward portion of the ideological continuum, and two groups (Radical Muslims and religious fundamentalists) representing the right. These groups vary in the degree to which the American people dislike them, with 79.6 % expressing some antipathy toward atheists, 78.5 % toward Radical Muslims, and 73.4 % toward Communists, but only 39.1 % disliking fundamentalists. I should also note that these questions represent difficult tests of tolerance, since they explicitly posit that the authorities had decided not to allow the demonstration (although the questions do not indicate
The average intercorrelation among these items is .64. When factor analyzed, this set of 20 items exhibits a strongly unidimensional structure, which indicates that a general propensity toward intolerance dominates the responses to the group-specific statements.
Just as with perceptions of freedom, racial differences in political intolerance are 21 statistically significant. Compared to whites, blacks are more intolerant, but only slightly so.
-21-why). Therefore, a tolerant reply requires that the respondent go against that decision.
[PLACE TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] Table 6 analysis.
-22-group or by another highly disliked group. Thus, the most appropriate conclusion is that intolerance is less widespread in 2005 than it was in 1954, although the level of intolerance of the American people today is still remarkably high.
The Connections Between Freedom and Intolerance in the U.S. Today
Although a full analysis of the causes and consequences of these attitudes is beyond the scope of this article, it is worthwhile to consider the types of Americans who perceive freedom and who are intolerant. Such an inquiry provides valuable evidence on whether "pluralistic intolerance" has any political consequences. This analysis focuses on the group sympathies of individuals and the degree to which they are associated with perceived freedom and political tolerance. For instance, one might hypothesize that those who express favorable views toward Radical Muslims perceive less freedom as being available to them, given the high level of antipathy toward Muslims in the United States.
Based on the various groups about which we queried the respondents as a prelude to the tolerance questions, Table 7 Although based on only 10 observations (groups), a strong relationship exists between 24 antipathy toward the group and the degree to which its sympathizers free unfree (r = -.53):
Groups that are disliked more by the American people perceive less political freedom. The group most unfree in the U.S. today is those holding sympathetic views toward Radical Muslims. Sympathizers with militarists and Communists are not far behind in 23 perceiving constraints on their freedom. What is perhaps more interesting, however, is the relatively common constraints on freedom perceived by Christian Fundamentalists and by those who oppose abortion rights. More than one-half of these mainstream groups believe they cannot exercise full political freedom in the United States today. It is also noteworthy that the respondents least likely to perceive repression are those sympathetic toward Gay Rights Activists and atheists, groups that are fairly widely disliked in American politics. Certainly there is 24 nothing in these data that suggests a dominant relationship between the degree to which radical views are espoused and perceptions of constraints on political freedom.
Perhaps the most unexpected of these findings is that so many Christian Fundamentalists perceive limits to their political freedom. Explaining why requires some speculation. It may well be that as Christian Fundamentalists have flexed their political muscles in recent times, they have become disappointed at the degree to which government stands as an impediment to achieving their goals. From prayers in schools and at football games to the display of religious This may be one explanation of the high level of political freedom asserted by the 25 American people during the days of McCarthyism. And indeed, perhaps the most pernicious form of political repression is that which inculcates low expectations. Understanding false consciousness is a task for which survey research is not well suited, however.
-24-symbols on state-owned property, fundamentalists are often thwarted today by the government.
Perhaps the relationship I observe here can be understood as a function of the degree of demand made on the public space. As groups demand more -as expectations rise -they are more likely to see government as unresponsive. Some are willing to make the inferential leap from lack of responsiveness to affirmative restrictions on political freedom. Perhaps those who want least from the public domain believe they have the most freedom available for their use.
25
From a more theoretical vantage point, only a minority of the American people would support banning a demonstration by Christian Fundamentalists (as is documented in Table 6 , above), yet supporters of Christian Fundamentalists perceive substantial constraints on their freedom. I take this as evidence that for the pernicious consequences of intolerance to materialize it is not necessary that a majority of the people be intolerant (as is implicitly assumed by the theory of pluralistic intolerance). Where significant pockets of intolerance exist, many citizens become fearful that even minority intolerance can be consequential, and they fear for their political freedom. Table 7 also reports the levels of intolerance of those who sympathize with these groups.
The first thing to note about the figures in this table that intolerance is widespread, and, for most, it matters little whether the intolerance concerns the most disliked or another highly disliked For each of the groups listed in Table 7 , the modal most disliked group is the Ku Klux 26 Klan, and the modes range from 36.7 % (those sympathetic to anti-abortions rights groups) to 73.5 % (Radical Muslims). In most instances, the mode exceeds 50 %. In terms of the other highly disliked group, the modal group is the same for all: Nazis. However, the modes range narrowly from 15.4 % (those who sympathize with U.S. Communists) to 25.9 % (atheist sympathizers), indicating a great deal of dispersion in the groups named as the other highly disliked group.
-25-group. In the tolerance columns, there is only a single instance in which intolerance does not 26 predominate: Among those sympathetic to atheists, only 38.2 % would not tolerant political activity by the other highly disliked group. In all other instances, the majority is intolerant. Some variability exists in intolerance: For instance, the range of intolerance directed at the most disliked group is from 58.8 % to 86.9 %: Intolerance predominates, to say the least.
It is noteworthy that at both the micro-and macro-levels, a strong relationship exists between the perception that one's liberty is restricted and political intolerance. Although based on only ten groups (but confirmed as well at the micro-level), the correlation between group sympathizers' intolerance and perceptions of restraints on their freedom is .65: Those who feel more unfree are likely to be more intolerant. The nature of the causal relationship between these two attitudes cannot be dissected -perhaps because they perceive themselves as not having freedom, it is easier to justify denying freedom to others -but a close connection exists between perceptions that the government should deny civil liberties to disliked groups and that it does deny civil liberties to groups to which one is favorably predisposed.
-26-
Theoretical Implications
This comparison between freedom and tolerance during the McCarthy era and today in the United States supports several important conclusions. Most interesting, even though intolerance is perhaps less widespread today (although not greatly so), the political freedom perceived by citizens is less than in the days of the Red Scare. This is an important puzzle that requires some additional thought and consideration.
Perhaps the reduced level of political freedom today is a product of the diffuse nature of intolerance in the contemporary U.S. Rather than being focused only on a single political ideology (Communists), intolerance is reasonably dispersed across the ideological continuum, with some Americans preferring not to tolerate groups on the left, but others focusing their intolerance on groups on the right. Not all members of these disliked groups, of course, perceive the intolerance and the associated limits on their individual freedom. But because some Communists are not tolerated and do not feel free, and because some Religious Fundamentalists are not tolerated and do not free, and because some of those sympathetic to other groups are not tolerated and do not feel free, the cumulative effect is more widespread feelings of lack of freedom today than in the McCarthy era.
Much has been written in the tolerance literature about the effect of pluralistic versus focused intolerance. The latter describes the McCarthy era, when nearly all citizens recognized the nature of the threat to the political system, whereas the former refers to disagreement among citizens as to where the primary threats lie. Conventional wisdom is that pluralistic intolerance tends to be benign, since disagreement on the targets of intolerance prevents a "critical mass" from forming and being effective at demanding repressive action from the government. But the -27-evidence of this analysis is that pluralistic intolerance may in fact be malevolent in the sense that many segments of the population are subject to perceptions of restrained freedom. If pluralistic intolerance is actually multidimensional intolerance -as it seems to be in the contemporary U.S. -then its consequences may be quite different than ordinarily presumed.
This last conjecture also points to the possibility that restraints on freedom are not exclusively or perhaps even primarily from the government. Expectations and norms widespread in the culture can inhibit free expression. Indeed, perhaps the most serious constraint of the McCarthy era was in the way in which ordinary citizens repressed each other, by which I mean they provided strong disincentives for the expression of anything remotely resembling a "radical" viewpoint. Within such a political climate, citizens often learn to "keep their mouths shut," which, as Noelle-Neumann has argued (1984), can create a "spiral of silence" in which those holding minority viewpoints are fearful of expression since they perceive their own views as unusual, which in turns leads to silence, which makes minority viewpoints even less commonly voiced, which in turns leads to silence, and so on (but see Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2005) . To the extent that a country's political culture does not encourage and reward expressions of a variety of points-of-view, political freedom is unlikely to be widespread.
Finally, more attention ought to be paid to the ways in which social networks enhance or limit individual freedom. Gibson (1992a) has shown that network homogeneity constrains speech, a finding reinforced by Mutz (2002) . Perhaps disincentives to the free expression of opinions are more a function of interpersonal interactions than the nefarious schemes of government. Since we actually know little about the internal dynamics of these processes, understanding the social processes contributing to intolerance, conformity, and the lose of -28-freedom is a matter of considerable importance for students of American politics. Perhaps the most urgent task of future research is to investigate more comprehensively the interconnections among intolerance, freedom, and repression. The theory of pluralistic intolerance is undoubtedly too simplistic to be able to account for the mobilization of intolerance into repression; many other factors are surely involved. Majority opposition to an idea or a group seems not to be necessary for dissidents to fear for their individual freedom. Perhaps from a policy-making viewpoint, whether the majority supports repression is important. But from the perspective of cultural constraints on freedom, it seems to matter much less whether a majority, or just a significant number of people, would not tolerate political activity by a group. Is the United States embarking on a new era of rampant intolerance and political repression, mimicking
McCarthyism? Perhaps not. But even in the absence of widespread, focused intolerance, the unwillingness to allow minority viewpoints to be expressed and advocated appears to be pernicious. The responses to these questions were collected on a five-point response set. The means b reported here are based on the uncollapsed distributions.
Note: The questions read:
Critical speech: Do you think the government would allow you to make a speech in public criticizing the actions of the government?
Public meetings: Do you think the government would allow you to organize public meetings to oppose the government?
Protest marches: Do you think the government would allow you to organize protest marches and demonstrations to oppose the actions of the government? The affect scale varies from 1 to 11, with high scores indicating greater positive affect. For a the group affect ratings, the minimum number of valid respondents is 976. The responses to these questions were collected on a five-point response set. The means b reported here are based on the uncollapsed distributions.
This index is the mean of the responses to the three tolerance items for each of the two c groups. Note: The question referred to a group that "wanted to hold public rallies and demonstrations in your community to advance their cause, but that the authorities decided to prohibit it," and asked how the respondent would "react to such a ban by the authorities of a public demonstration" by the group.
These percentages are based on collapsing strong support with ordinary support and strong a opposition with ordinary opposition. The percentages total to 100 percent across the rows (except for rounding errors).
High scores indicate greater degrees of tolerance. The means reported here are based on the b uncollapsed distributions.
"Atheists" is the commonly used shorthand for the actual stimulus, which was: "someone c who is against all religion and churches." 
